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Crémer and McLean [1] and McAfee and Reny [3] showed that, in
“nearly all auctions”, the seller can oﬀer a mechanism that obtains full
rent extraction. The mechanism designed by Crémer and McLean diﬀers
from standard procedures in several respects. Notably, (a) bidders are
required to buy “lotteries” in order to partecipate at the auction; (b)
bidders are treated non-anonymously, in the sense that diﬀerent bidders
are given diﬀerent strategic options; (c) the bidders’ payments to the seller
depend not only on the bids but also on some other “actions” taken by
the bidders. In this paper, I keep (a) and (b), and impose that — like in
the “standard model of auctions” — the bidders’ payments to the seller
depend on the bids alone. I find that the full-surplus extraction result no
longer holds: There are “open sets” of auctions where the full extraction
is not possible.
1 Introduction
Auctions occupy an important place within economic theory due not only to
the unquestionable importance of this procedure in economic life ([8], [6]), but
also because an auction mechanism can be considered an archetype of a general
mechanism design problem. In fact, problems like optimal taxation, regulation,
monopolistic price discrimination, trade under asymmetric information, public
good provision display, essentially, the same structure as an auction problem.
In a typical auction an individual, the seller, auctions oﬀ a single object to N
bidders. The seller maximizes his expected revenue from the auction by design-
ing a set of rules according to which the object is awarded to one of the bidders.
Each bidder privately knows how much the good is worth to him. Given such
private information and the rules set by the seller, the strategic problem bid-
ders face is modeled as a game with incomplete information. Hence, the seller’s
∗I am grateful to Jaques Crémer and Paolo Siconolfi for insightful comments and explana-
tions.
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problem can be viewed as that of choosing the game of incomplete information
that the bidders will play. An extensive literature has studied how diﬀerent
mechanisms perform from the viewpoint of the seller (first-price, second-price,
Dutch and English auction, etc.) as well as conditions under which all these
mechanisms give the same expected revenue.
It is clear that the presence of bidders’ private information (about their
own valuations, their beliefs about the opponents’ valuations, etc.) constitutes
the main hurdle the sellers faces in pursuing his objective. In fact, it seems
reasonable to conjecture that the bidders’ private information would lead them
to enjoy positive rents and, hence, limit the seller’s ability to maximize his
revenue. Yet, contrary to this intuition, work by Crémer and McLean [1] and
McAfee and Reny [3] has shown that — in “nearly all auctions” — the seller can
oﬀer a mechanism that obtains full rent extraction.
Most likely, this result can be falsified in real life situations as the assump-
tions of the theoretical model are hardly met. Yet, it is unquestionable that,
on a purely theoretical ground, the mechanism of Crémer and McLean does the
job. This has generated a lot of skepticism, if not disbelief, to the point that
McAfee and Reny conclude that “the full rent extraction result casts doubt on
the value of the current mechanism design paradigm as a model of institutional
design” ( [3], p. 400). Because of this state of things, it seems worthwhile to
investigate on the assumptions of Crémer and McLean’s model as well as on the
features of the mechanism that they proposed.
As it will be explained below, the mechanism that extracts full surplus diﬀers
from standard procedures in several respects. Notably, (a) bidders are required
to buy “lotteries” in order to participate at the auction; (b) bidders are treated
non-anonymously, in the sense that diﬀerent bidders are given diﬀerent strategic
options; (c) the bidders’ payments to the seller depend not only on the bids but
also on some other “actions” taken by the bidders.
On a theoretical ground, the introduction of lotteries is not, by itself, par-
ticularly relevant. If the only eﬀect of lotteries is to generate some additional
payment from the bidders to the seller, then, in many instances, lotteries can be
replaced by a simple participation fee. However, lotteries do come to play a big
role when their introduction is combined with some other innovation, like (b)
and/or (c) above. Because of this, it seems reasonable to mantain the use of the
lotteries, and study the implications of (b) and (c) separately, by dropping them
one at a time. Here I keep (a) and (b), and impose that the bidders’ payments
to the seller depend on the bids alone. This conforms to what is called the
“standard model of auctions” (McAfee and McMillan [2]) and to the procedures
commonly used in practice (first-price, second-price, Dutch and English auc-
tion, etc.). The finding is that the full-surplus extraction result no longer holds:
There are “open sets” of auctions where the full extraction is not possible. More
than the finding by itself, what is more important is the reason why it is so as,
by contrast, this would clarify some aspects of Crémer and McLean’s result as
well. As the proof will make it clear (section 4), the “non-full surplus extrac-
tion” result is due to the following reason. Generally speaking, the emerging
of rents does not depend on the fact that —at some level — the seller “does not
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know” what information the bidders have. For instance, the seller could picture
a hypothetical individual with some valuation and some beliefs, and design a
mechanism that extracts full rent from that individual. Since a seller can con-
ceive the set of all possible bidders’ valuations as well as the set of all possible
bidders’ beliefs, it is pretty clear that — for every single bidder’s type — he can
design a mechanism that targets that type, and extracts that type’s rent. Then,
from the viewpoint of the seller, the bidders’ private information matters only
if there is an inability to design a mechanism that simultaneously targets every
single bidders’ type. The proof shows that when the bidders’ payments to the
seller depend on the bids alone, the seller, so to speak, does not have enough
“tools” to target all the bidders’ types simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model used in
the paper, and Section 3 the mechanism of Crémer and McLean. Section 4
studied the case when payments depend on the bids alone. Section 5 concludes
by discussing some related work.
2 The Model
Throughout the paper, the number of bidders is finite. The set of bidders is
denoted by I, I = {1, 2, ..., N}. For simplicity, I deal with the independent
private value case, only. All the reasonings can be eﬀortlessly extended — but at
the cost of tedious qualifications — to the common value case or to any common-
private value mix. Since Crémer and McLean have remarked in several occasions
how this can be done, there is no reason to do so here. The model is the same as
Crémer and McLean’s. It will be described by using the terminology of Mertens
and Zamir [5] as this will make the main argument much more transparent.
Each bidders i ∈ I has a valuation for the object v ∈ Vi, where Vi is a




is the basic domain of uncertainty for our problem. Ti denotes the set of types
for bidder i, and TN = ×
i
Ti. Recall that a type can be identified to a probability
measure on V N × TN−1, and observe that — in our special case — any of such
measures must be the unit mass, δ(·), on that type’s valuation. Hence, by means
of the identification v 7−→ δ(v), the universal belief space generated by V N is
Ω = TN = ×Ti.
I restrict to problems that display a common prior P on T . Then, each
type ti ∈ Ti can be derived from P as a conditional probability. I do so since
the mechanism of Crémer and McLean is designed for these type of situations.
Following Crémer and McLean, we have
Definition 1 An information structure with basic domain of uncertainty V N
is a pair (TN , P ), where P is a probability measure on TN .1 The set of all
1Crémer and McLean call an information structure a triple (TN , P,wi), where wi is a
valuation function, i.e. a mapping Ti −→ Vi, which associate each type with his own valuation.
I deleted the reference to wi as a type’s valuation is immediately derived from that type on
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information structures with basic domain of uncertainty V N is the set of all
pairs (TN , P ) as P varies among all possible probability measures on TN . Such
a set is denoted by I(V N ).
Definition 2 An information structure (TN , P ) ∈ I(V N ) is a finite informa-
tion structure if P has finite support in TN . The set of finite information
structures in I(V N ) is denoted by F(V N ).
Throughout the paper, the word generic refers to subsets of I(V N ), which
is endowed with the weak-* topology.
The next definition is slightly diﬀerent from Crémer and McLean’s. It is
so, because I need to distinguish between the case of auctions where payments
depend on bids alone from the case dealt with by Crémer and McLean, where
no such a restriction is imposed. For each i ∈ I, let Ai be a set, and let
a ∈ A = ×iAi. One can interpret Ai as the set of possible “messages” that
player i might send to the seller. Then,
Definition 3 An auction with message space A is a collection of mappings
{pi, xi}i∈I , with xi : A −→ R and pi : A −→ R such that pi(a) ≥ 0 for all i and
a ∈ A and
P
i∈I
pi(a) ≤ 1 for all a.
The interpretation is that if players “announce” a, then bidder i pays an
amount xi(a) to participate at the auction, and is awarded the object with





to maximize his expected revenue. Bidder i’s utility is given by vi(t)− xi(a(t))
if he is awarded the object, and by −xi(a(t)) if he is not.
Crémer and McLean’s result (see below) can be rephrased by saying that
the seller can choose A = TN and mappings {pi, xi}i∈I so that full-surplus
extraction obtains.
Let Bi be the set of possible bids for player i, and let B = ×iBi.
Definition 4 We say that payments depend on bids alone if A = B. In such a
case, we will say that the auction is a “standard auction”.
3 The Mechanism of Crémer and McLean
The mechanism can be described as follows. Each bidder i has to pick an element
in a set Li. A typical element li ∈ Li is a mapping li : ×
j 6=i
(Lj ×Bj) −→ R,
specifying bidder i’s payment to the seller as a function of the other bidders’
choices as well as their bids. I will refer to elements in Li as lotteries as they are
such from the viewpoint of bidder i. The object is awarded to the highest bid
(with the addition of a tie-breaking rule, which is irrelevant for our purposes).
the basis of the observation made in the previous paragraph.
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→ R for each bidder
i. A strategy for bidder i is a mapping σi : Ti → ∆ (Li ×Bi). This completes
the description of the game with incomplete information chosen by the seller.
Then, when TN is a finite set, we have
Theorem 5 [Crémer and McLean [1]] Generically (in the space of all the
P ’s on TN), the seller can choose the sets Li ’s so that there exists an equilibrium
of the corresponding game such that (I) Players play dominant strategies; (II)
Full surplus extraction obtains.
A similar result holds for the uncountable compact case (McAfee and Reny
[3]).
To see how full surplus extraction obtains, let us begin by observing that
since for each bidder the payment is determined by means of an li ∈ Li, bidder
i’s payment does not depend on his own bid. Hence, the rule that the object is
awarded to the highest bid implies that it is a dominant strategy for bidder i to
bid his own valuation.
Denote by tik a type for bidder i who has valuation v
i
k for the object, and by
gik the expected gain gross of the payment that type t
i
k obtains at this dominant-
strategy profile.
Under these circumstances, the seller’s problem is solved if, for each bidder
i, the seller can find a set of lotteries, Li, such that (at the above dominant
strategies) the following is true for each i’s type
E(lik | tik) = gik
E(liz | tik) > E(lik | tik), z 6= k (1)
In words, when oﬀered a choice among the lotteries in the set Li, type tik picks
lottery lik and his (total) expected gain is zero.
For simplicity, I illustrate the argument in the two-bidder case. Let T =
{t1, t2, ..., tm} be the set of bidder 1’s types, and let Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θm} be that
of player 2.2 In such a case, the common prior P is a matrix, P = (pij), on
T ×Θ. Denote by pk = P (· | tk) and qk = P (· | θk) the conditionals computed
from P (the types).
Now, suppose that bidder 2 is oﬀered a set of lotteries Λ = {λ1, ...,λm}, and




pk · l˜k = g1k k = 1, ...,m
pk · l˜j > g1k k 6= j
or,
pk · l˜k = g1k k = 1, ...,m
pj · l˜k > g1j k 6= j
2To shorten the exposition, I have assumed that T and Θ have the same cardinality.
Obviously, the Crémer and McLean argument does not require such a condition.
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Equivalently, we must find m linear functionals, {l1, ..., lm}, such that
pk · lk = 0 k = 1, ...,m
pj · lk > 0 k 6= j
In other words, the linear functional lk must separate pk and co {p1, ..., pk−1, pk+1, ...pm}
[co denotes the convex hull], and, for each k, we must find a linear functional
that does so.
It’s clear that we can fulfill such a request as long as
pk ∩ co {p1, ..., pk−1, pk+1, ...pm} = ∅, ∀k (2)
Let P1 be the matrix of conditional probabilities of bidder 1. Since (detP1 6= 0)
=⇒ condition (2), generically we can do so. Hence, given bidder 2’s choices,
{λ1, ...,λm}, and valuations, {v1, ..., vm}, we can use the components of the
vector lk to define a function
lk(λj , vj) 7−→ R
which is our desired lottery.
Finally, we can proceed in a similar way for bidder 2.
It is worth remarking that, in this way, Crémer and McLean constructively
provide a mechanism that leads to full surplus extraction. One of the mech-
anism’s virtues is that the actual state of the world the bidders’ payment is
contingent upon is verifiable not only by the bidders and the seller but also by
an outside observer. This is so because the payment depends on the lotteries
and the bids chosen by the other bidders, both of which are observable, and not
on the other bidders’ types (which are unobservable).
4 The Case when Payments Depend on the Bids
Alone
Throughout this section, I consider mechanisms that have the same structure as
the Crémer and McLean’s mechanism above, but with the additional restrictions
that payments depend on the bids alone. I will refer to these mechanisms as
BA (for bids alone) mechanisms. BA mechanisms imply a restriction on the
domain of the lotteries: elements of Li are now mappings li : ×
j 6=i
Bj −→ R.
Just like before, bidder i’s payment does not depend on his own bid, and, once
again, the rule that the object is awarded to the highest bid implies that it is
a dominant strategy for bidder i to bid his own valuation. It follows that (at
such a dominant-strategy profile) the only beliefs that are relevant to determine
player i’s expected payment are the first-order beliefs, that is i’s beliefs on other
players’ valuations. I am going to show that
Theorem 6 Generically in I(V N ), BA mechanisms do not obtain full surplus
extraction.
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The proof will be given first for the case of a finite set of possible valua-
tions, and then extended to the case of uncountable but compact set of possible
valuations.
4.1 Finite Set of Valuations
Recall that the space of possible types for a player can be identified to the space
of probability distributions on V N × TN−1. Here, I assume that V is a finite
set, V = {v1, ..., vk}. To avoid trivialities, I also assume that k > 1.
To ease the exposition, I present the proof for the two-bidder case since the
argument goes unchanged for the N -bidder case.
Let (Θ1 ×Θ2, P ) be a finite 2-bidder information structure with common
prior P . Here, Θ1 ×Θ2 denotes the support of P in Ω = T1 × T2, the universal
beliefs space. To avoid tedious qualifications, I treat players symmetrically by
assuming that Θ1 = Θ2 = Θ. The assumption does not entail any loss in
generality since, in all of my reasoning, it will be suﬃcient to consider the
player with the larger number of types. In the 2-bidder case, the common prior
P can be represented by a matrix on Θ×Θ. Notice that since P is a common
prior and T1 × T2 is constructed as a projective limit, for any j we have a map
P 7−→ P ji , which associates the common prior with the beliefs of order j of
player i. In particular, i’s first-order beliefs, P 1i , are univoquely determined. In
what follows, I will suppress the reference to player i, since all the reasonings
refer to one bidder only.
Let us begin by giving necessary an suﬃcient conditions for a BA mechanism
to obtain full-surplus extraction.
Lemma 7 Let ϕ ∈ F(V N ) be a finite information structure, and let m =
card(Θ). Let P 1 be the matrix of first-order beliefs. Then, there exists a BA
mechanism which obtains full surplus extraction iﬀ no row in P 1 is a convex
combination of the other rows.
Obviously, this is the same argument that we saw for Crémer and McLean,
but now restricted to first-order beliefs. The proof is included only for com-
pleteness.
Proof. Denote by pj the j-th row of P 1, j = 1, 2, ...,m. The k-component
vector pj is a probability distribution on V = {v1, ..., vk}.
As explained in the above, in order to show that full surplus extraction
obtains we need to show that there exist m linear functionals — l˜1, l˜2, ..., l˜m —
such that
pj l˜j = E(u | θj) (3)
pj l˜k > E(u | θj) , k 6= j
or equivalently that there exist m linear functionals — l1, l2, ..., lm — such that
pjlj = 0 (4)
pklj > 0 , k 6= j
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Just like before, m linear functional, l1, l2, ..., lm, with the desired properties
exist if and only if
pj ∩ co {p1, ..., pj−1, pj+1, ..., pm} = ∅ , j = 1, ...,m (5)
In fact, if condition (5) is satisfied for pj , then the desired linear functional
lj exists by any elementary separation theorem. The converse (necessity) is
obvious.
From the lemma, it emerges that we need to inquire into the conditions
under which no row in P 1 is a convex combination of the other rows, which is
what the next lemma addresses.
Recall that the common prior P = (pij) is a matrix on Θ×Θ. The element
pij gives the probability that bidder 1 is of type θi and bidder 2 is of type θj .
Recall also that a type is a conditional probability on V 2 × Θ, and that his
first order belief is a probability on V , computed as a marginal from his type.
Therefore, bidder 1’s first-order beliefs give the probability that bidder 2 has
valuation vj given that bidder 1 is of type θi. Denote by 1vl the map on Θ that
takes value 1 if type θ has valuation vl, and 0 otherwise. Clearly, player 1’s first-
order beliefs (the elements of the matrix P 1) are computed from P according
to the formula








Let {Jl}k1 be a partition of the set of types, Θ, so that two types, θ and θ0, are in
the same class if they have the same valuation (v = v0 = vl, for some l). Then,
Lemma 8 A row in P 1 is a convex combination of the other rows if ∃λ ∈ Rm,







 = 0 , l = 1, ..., k
where cj is the j-th column in P (the common prior).




















Conversely, if ∃λ satisfying (7), then the n-th row in P 1 is a convex combi-
nation of the other rows.
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Proof. We saw that a generic element, p1il, in P
















Suppose that row n in P 1 is a convex combination of the other rows. This means
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, z = 1, ..., k
To ease the notation, denote by p·j the sum of the elements of the j-th row in
P , and set pn,Jz =
P
j∈Jz









, z = 1, ..., k























The converse is obvious.
The proof of the theorem rests on the following simple
Lemma 9 Let d1, ..., dk ∈ Rm, k < m. Then, ∃λ ∈ Rm, λ 6= 0, such that
λdl = 0 , l = 1, ..., k
Moreover, either λ is proportional to an element of the canonical basis of Rm













Proof. Let d1, ..., dk ∈ Rm. By the dimension theorem and the orthogonal
decomposition of Euclidean spaces, k < m implies ∃λ ∈ Rm, λ 6= 0, such that
λdl = 0, l = 1, ..., k.
First, suppose that djl 6= 0, j = 1, ...,m and l = 1, ..., k. Let {αj}mj=1 be a
set of numbers such that
mP
j=1
αj = 0. Then, clearly the vector





solves the l-th equation, l = 1, ..., k.
Now, define a vector λ ∈ Rm by


































































If djl = 0 for some j and l, then it is clear — by repeating the same reasoning
or by simple geometric inspection — that a λ of the same form exists as long as
k < m− 1 or at least one of the d1, ..., dk has at least two components diﬀerent
from zero (this is obtained by simply setting in the above reasoning αj = 0
when djl = 0).
The only case where the above reasoning does not apply is when k = m− 1
and each dj is proportional to a vector of the canonical basis of Rm. In such a
case, our λ must be itself proportional to a vector of the canonical basis of Rm.
We can now prove a useful intermediate result
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Theorem 10 Given a finite information structure ϕ ∈ F(V N ), there exists
a BA mechanisms which obtains full surplus extraction if and only if both the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) P has full rank
(b) v 6= v0 =⇒ θ 6= θ0
Proof. Let card(Θ) = m. The matrix P 1 of a bidder’s first-order beliefs is
an m × k matrix. Hence, its k columns are vectors in Rm. Let m > k. Then,
it cannot be that all the vectors are vectors of the canonical basis in Rm (this
would imply that at least one row in the m ×m matrix P is 0, contradicting












= 0, l = 1, ..., k. Hence, at least one row in P 1 is a convex
combination of the others, and by Lemma 7 full surplus extraction does not
obtain.
It follows that a necessary condition for full surplus extraction is m = k,
that is diﬀerent valuations are associated to diﬀerent types3. In such a case, P 1
is a k × k matrix, and by Lemma 7 a necessary and suﬃcient condition for full
surplus extraction is that P 1 has full rank. In turn, this is the case if and only
if the common prior P is itself a k × k matrix with full rank.
We can now complete the proof of the theorem for the finite case.
Proof. Recall that the set F(V N ) of finite information structures is the set
of all pairs (Ω, P ), where Ω = TN is the universal space of beliefs and P has
finite support in Ω. It follows from theorem 10 that the set of all auctions for
which there exists a BA mechanism which obtains full surplus extraction can
be identified to a subset of the probability distribution whose support is a set of
k×k points. Hence, it is a subset of a linear space of dimension (k×k−1), and
is not dense in F(V N ), which has infinite dimension. From this, by observing
that the set of probability distribution with finite support in Ω is dense in the
set of all probability distributions on Ω ( [4]), we have that the full surplus
extraction property of BA mechanisms in not generic in I(V N ).
Remark 11 By observing that a subspace of finite dimension h is closed with
empty interior in a space of dimension z > h, the proof shows a stronger result:
Generically, a BA mechanism does not obtain full surplus extraction.
4.2 Compact set of valuations
The extension of the argument to the case where V is an uncountable though
compact subset of the real line does not respond to a mere technical need. In
fact, the explanatory power of the model with a finite set of valuations is severely
limited by the presumption that the seller as well as all the bidders have an exact
3Recall that one of the requirements in the construction of the type space is that a type
knows his own valuation.
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knowledge of the possible valuations. As soon as we admit that such a knowledge
might not be exact, as it seems to be the case in most circumstances, we are
naturally led to consider models with an uncountable set of possible valuations.
This circumstance is clearly reflected by the widespread use of such a model in
the economic literature. The remaining of this section proves Theorem 6 for
such a case.
Proof. Suppose that generically in I(V N ) there exists a BA mechanism
which obtains full surplus extraction (FSE). It follows at once from this as-
sumption that there exists one information structure (Ω, P ∗) such that P ∗ has
full support and FSE obtains.
The set {(Ω, P ) | P has finite support} is dense in I(V N ). Hence, there is a
sequence {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 such that
(i) (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗)
(ii) for any integer j, Pj has finite support.
The assumption of genericity of FSE implies that we can construct the se-
quence {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 so that FSE obtains for (Ω, Pj), for any integer j. Moreover,
without loss, we can assume that, along {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 , Supp(Pj) ⊆ Supp(Pj+1)
for each j [we can obtain this by simply constructing a new sequence with the
desired property from {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 ].





of first-order beliefs of player i, i = 1, ..., N .
By construction, FSE obtains on {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 , ∀j. From the proof for the
finite case, we know that for this to be true it must be true that for each j there
is a bijection
bj : Vj −→ Tj
where Vj is a finite subset of V and Tj is a finite subset of T (the set of types
for player i) [From the proof for the finite case, we know that for finite subsets
of valuations, FSE obtains iﬀ the mapping from valuations to first-order beliefs
is a bijection. Then, with each first-order belief associate that type with that
first order belief]. Recall that the consistency condition that a type knows his
own valuation implies valuation v is associated to a type who has valuation v
bj(v) = tv (9)
Now, each bj satisfies (9), and since Tj ⊆ Tj+1 and bj is a bijection
bj ≤ bj+1
in the ordering of partial functions.
Let B be the set of partial functions defined on closed subsets of V which
satisfy property (9). By Zorn’s Lemma, B has a maximal element.
As (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗), Tj −→ T and, along such a sequence, bj can be
extended to a maximal element in B, which has necessarily V as domain.
Summarizing, along the sequence (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗) we can construct a
bijection b : V −→ T which satisfies property (9).
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Because of property (9) and the construction of Ω, such a b is defined by





where i is the canonical injection. Hence, b can be taken to be continuous.











where ∼ denotes a homeomorphism. It follows that the mapping T −→ V
constructed on the right hand part of the diagram is the inverse of b, and it is
continuous.
Therefore, along the sequence (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗), the mapping b : V −→ T
can be taken to be a homeomorphism.
But, Ω is V N -based. Hence, T can be taken to be Π(V N × TN−1), and our
construction implies that there is a homeomorphism V ∼ Π(V N ×TN−1). Such
a homeomorphism requires both V and T to be one-point spaces, contrary to
our hypothesis.
5 Related work
In this paper, we have established that, if the bidders’ payments to the seller
depend on the bids alone, full extraction of the surplus is, generally speaking, no
longer possible. As we saw in Section 4, the reason is that there is no bijection
between the set of states of the world and the set of bidders’ incentive-compatible
choices associated to full surplus extraction.
Recently, the work on full surplus extraction has been criticized by Neeman
[7]. According to Neeman [7], the result is driven by the assumption, implicitly
embedded into the model, of a one-to-one relation between a player’s beliefs
(over the other players’ types) and his willingness to pay for the object.
While this is true for a large part of the applied work on auctions, in my view
this critique does not apply to the work of Crémer and McLean. To see the point,
the reader should observe that in most of the applied work a bidder’s type is
identified to his valuation for the object. As a consequence, the requirement that
the matrix of a bidder’s beliefs (over the other types) have full-rank immediately
produces a one-to-one relation between beliefs and valuations. On the contrary,
no such identification (between types and valuations) is made in Crémer and
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McLean. Moreover, from the model described in Section 2, it follows at once
that no one-to-one relation between types and beliefs can be postulated. This
is immediately seen in the case of a finite set of valuations. Since no restriction
is imposed on the cardinality of the set of types, this latter can be much larger
(and it is so in all the relevant cases) than the set of possible valuations (this
is the only case to consider as two diﬀerent valuations produce two diﬀerent
first-order beliefs — see Section 2 — and, hence, two diﬀerent types).
As explained in Section 3, the reason why the mechanism still works is that,
by making a player’s payment depend not only on the other players’ bids but also
on the lotteries chosen by them, one can still establish the existence of a bijection
between incentive-compatible choices and states of the world. This is equivalent
to the bidders declaring their types, i.e. their valuations, their first-order beliefs,
second-order beliefs, etc.. Given this, since the bidders’ expected payments are
linear in the probabilities, the seller can set the payments contingent on the
various states of the world so that full surplus extraction obtains.
References
[1] Crémer, J.and R. McLean (1988), “Full Extraction of the Surplus in
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions”, Econometrica 56, 1247-57.
[2] McAfee, P.R. and J. McMillan (1987), “Auctions and Bidding”, Journal of
Economic Literature XXV, 699-738.
[3] McAfee, P.R. and P.J. Reny (1992), “Correlated Information and Mechanism
Design”, Econometrica 60, 395-421.
[4] Mertens, J.-F., S. Sorin and S. Zamir (1990), Repeated Games, CORE work-
ing paper.
[5] Mertens, J.-F. and S. Zamir (1985), “Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for
Games with Incomplete Information”, International Journal of Game The-
ory 14, 1-29.
[6] Milgrom, P., Auction Theory for Privatization, Cambridge University Press
(forthcoming)
[7] Neeman, Z. (1999), “The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism
Design”, mimeo, Boston University.
[8] Safire, W., The greatest auction ever, The New York Times, 3.16.95.
14
